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Africa and her Challenge to Modernity 
The topic I propose to discuss is here “Africa and her Challenge to Modernity”.  To talk 
of Africa and her challenge to modernity enfolds many possibilities but it is not without 
conundrums.  These are not quite hospitable times to talk about modernity, unless of course one 
were merely interested in restating the usual patter about what modernity has done to Africa and 
like attitudes.  That is not what I propose to do in what follows.  Additionally, to talk of Africa’s 
challenge to modernity, one might have the impression that Africa is external to modernity, has 
no truck with it in some manner of speaking and is daring modernity.  This, too, will not be a 
fruitful tack to take.  What then gives? 
 
In my view, Africa’s challenge to modernity is related to another challenge that I had 
slightly over ten years ago identified in respect of Africa and Philosophy in my essay, 
“Exorcising Hegel’s Ghost: Africa’s Challenge to Philosophy”1.  There I lamented, but also 
spiritedly challenged, the exclusion of African phenomena from the province of the discipline of 
philosophy.  I traced the mindset that always locked Africa away in a box marked 
“DIFFERENT”, and placed any discourse about Africa beyond the pale of the discourse of the 
rest of humanity to the blood libel that Hegel executed in his Lectures in the Philosophy of World 
History2, a text much celebrated by philosophers everywhere.  I argued there that that mindset 
has dominated and continues to dominate the ideological understanding of Africa’s place in the 
concert of humanity.  Not much has changed since then.  In this discussion, I wish to extend the 
same consideration to the issue of Africa’s place in modernity.  So, when I speak of Africa’s 
challenge to modernity it is to be understood in the following general terms: 
 
1. What have been the relations between Africa and modernity? 
 
2. How have Africa and its phenomena featured in the discourse of modernity? 
 
3. Why should we care about these questions? 
 
Before we answer these questions, it is proper that we outline the main tenets of 
modernity that will frame our discussion.   We work with a very historicized and, therefore, 
narrow conception of modernity.  Modernity refers to that movement of ideas, practices and 
institutions that originated in Europe the roots of which are generally traced to the Renaissance, 
moving through the voyages of Discovery, the Reformation and the Enlightenment.  It gave us 
such milestones as the English Civil War and Act of Settlement of 1701, the American 
Revolution, the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the Scientific Revolution, the 
Industrial Revolution, as well as Capitalism.  But, it is modernity’s philosophical discourse that 
interests us because, ultimately, its most lasting impact has not been that it enabled us to build 
nuclear weapons or send humans into space.  Rather, in creating and widely disseminating a new 
and radically different view of human nature unique to it, and creating the kinds of values, 
practices and institutions promotive of the efflorescence of this specific mode of being human, 
modernity represents an epoch all its own in the history of human evolution. 
 
I work with a rather benign—others will consider it rather sanguine, given the current 
debates about its worth—conception of modernity.  Various components make up the modern 
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way of life.  The first is a philosophical anthropology succinctly described by G.W.F. Hegel as 
“the principle of subjectivity”.  According to Hegel,  
 
the principle of the modern world is freedom of subjectivity, the principle that all the 
essential factors present in the intellectual whole are now coming into their right in the 
course of their development.  Starting from this point of view, we can hardly raise the 
idle question: Which is the better form of government, monarchy or democracy?  We 
may only say that all constitutional forms are one-sided unless they can sustain in 
themselves the principle of subjectivity and know how to correspond with a matured 
rationality.3   
 
He expounded the idea further at #124:  
 
The right of the subject’s particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other words the right 
of subjective freedom, is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and 
modern times.  This right in its infinity is given expression in Christianity and it has 
become the universal effective principle of a new form of civilization.  Amongst the 
primary shapes which this right assumes are love, romanticism, the quest for the eternal 
salvation of the individual, &c.; next come moral convictions and conscience; and, 
finally, the other forms, some of which come into prominence in what follows as the 
principle of civil society and as moments in the constitution of the state, while others 
appear in the course of history, particularly the history of art, science, and philosophy.4 
 
Although Hegel goes on to derive civil society and, subsequently, the state from this 
basis, it is only insofar as this principle is also the basis of the individualist anthropology that 
defines modern times that it is of interest to us.  The centrality of the individual to the dominant 
forms of social living in modern society and its associated derivative notions of civic, moral and 
legal responsibility are manifestations of what Hegel celebrates as the triumph of subjectivity.  
The sociological concomitant of this metaphysical principle is individualism.    
 
No doubt, the idea of individualism predated the modern age.  My contention is that (1) 
the notion of the individual that is dominant in the modern age is without precedent, at least in 
the Euro-American tradition from which the remaining parts of the world who have embraced 
modernity extracted it; and (2) it is under the modern regime that individualism is the preferred 
principle of social ordering and almost everything else is understood in terms of how well or ill it 
serves the interests of the individual.  Thus, although it is true that there was some recognition of 
the individual in pre-modern epochs, it is in the modern epoch that the individual is not merely 
supreme; whatever detracts from the rights of the individual is, precisely for that reason, to be 
rejected. 
 
This notion of the individual took a long time to emerge but it received one of its most 
dramatic consecrations in the Protestant Reformation when the subject, that is, the individual, 
was made the centrepiece of Christian soteriology.  The subject must win eternity for himself, 
helped of course by grace.  One’s genealogy, status and similar attributes counted for nothing or, 
at least theoretically, ought to count for nothing in the allocation of goods, services, or even 
recognition.  The key element is that of individual striving, what the individual makes of herself 
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and whatever talent she is endowed with by Nature.  To this principle we trace the Merit 
Principle; the meritocracy that promises rewards to individuals according as they show 
themselves worthy, by developing their talents.  One consequence of the focus on the individual 
in the modern state is that no longer are individuals’ futures determined by the circumstances of 
their birth.  Humans can abridge status, class, and other boundaries, as long as they are willing to 
improve themselves enough to fit them for whatever station they aspire to occupy.  One can 
easily see how racism and sexism, wherever they exist, subvert this modern orientation. 
 
The second component that interests us here is a social ontology respecting the relation 
between the individual and the community, manifested in the peculiar bifurcation between the 
state and civil society.  It is the basis for probably the most dramatic innovation brought by 
modernity in its wake: the principle of governance by consent.  I refer to the central tenet of 
political theory in the modern age under which no one ought to acknowledge the authority of, or 
owe an obligation to obey, any government in the constitution of which he or she has played no 
part.  That is, no government is legitimate to which the governed have not consented.  When the 
American revolutionaries first used this principle as their rallying cry in 1776, it was the first 
culmination of a new principle of legitimacy, the philosophical grounds of which had been 
foreshadowed in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
others.  From that point on, whether it was in the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the 
much less abrupt transfer of power from the monarch and the nobility to the House of Commons 
in Britain, the authority of every ruler by the grace of God, or by reason of birth, was vulnerable 
to the challenge posed by the new thinking concerning the issue of who ought to rule when not 
all can rule.  
 
A third component is a philosophy of time concerning the relations among the past, the 
present, and the future.  It is a horizon that is always open to the future; one in which things 
never are, they are always becoming.  This yields a near obsession with the ‘new’ in the modern 
age.  Change is celebrated for its own sake and the best is forever yet to come.  The ideological 
orientation built on this is the abiding faith and almost unquestioning commitment to progress.  
The belief in progress, in its desirability, and its possibility is at the bottom of much of the 
restlessness of the modern age, in which nothing is regarded as settled and, as noted earlier, the 
best always is yet to come.  Few are the inquiries made into the desirability of progress and to 
question change is to earn the scorn of the apostles of the modern age for whom rest is 
synonymous with decay and death.   
 
Finally, we identify a social epistemology in which Reason plays a central role and 
knowledge is founded, not on revelation, tradition or authority, but on conformity with Reason.  
Modern society fancies itself as a society of knowledge, one in which the claims of tradition and 
authority do not mean much and every truth claim must be authenticated by Reason.  Whoever 
can show that she has superior knowledge commands our assent and respect.  This is contrasted 
with the pre-modern situation where authority went largely unchallenged, tradition reigned 
supreme and reason was appointed a handmaiden to Revelation.  These four components 
conjointly make up the subject-matter of the philosophical discourse of modernity.5  
 
We may now respond to the first of our three questions: What have been the relations 
between Africa and modernity?  Rocky, to put it mildly.  Here are a few assumptions that inform 
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my discussion, even though I do not defend any of them on this occasion.  My relationship to 
modernity is fraught with ambivalence.  I am either a savage critic of modernity or an overly 
enthusiastic defender of it.  In this discussion, I am wearing my ambivalence hat and here is why.  
I do believe that modernity, in its Enlightenment Project inflection represents a giant leap 
forward in human history and that the gains it offers, had they been on the table in colonial 
Africa, would have made for a better life and more salubrious history than that bequeathed by 
colonialism in the continent.  I assume that of many subject peoples in the world, Africans have 
borne, in a somewhat disproportionate manner, the burdens of modernity without ever having 
enjoyed its most important benefits.  So, in a sense, what I am doing is arguing for the continuing 
relevance of modernity in the African situation.  Yet, were this to be a different occasion, I 
would insist that even the best that modern society has to offer falls radically short of what 
would be the best life for humans and the best society to lead that life in.6 
 
Why have the relations between Africa and modernity been rocky?  The answer is a very 
simple one:  because of the impact of colonialism.  Colonialism?  Yes, that is the simple answer.  
Certainly, Africans were not the only ones to have suffered the indignities and degradations of 
colonialism.  The difference is that other ex-colonies have gone on to greater heights.  India is a 
good example.  Few will say that Nigeria and other ex-African colonies, with the possible 
exception of South Africa, have either thriving economies or can be adjudged modern states.  
Again, although many ex-colonies have managed to create polities marked by the rule of law and 
governance by consent, in spite of the fact that many African countries are now ostensibly under 
representative democracies, one will be hard put to call them modern polities.  Why is this so?   
 
It is time for us to rethink the relationship between modernity and colonialism in Africa.  
It is time to challenge the received wisdom that colonialism facilitated the introduction and 
installation of modernity in Africa.  Were this to be true, the career of modernization processes in 
post-independence Africa ought to have been different.  Given that it has been marked by failure, 
a fact that, in spite of recent gains in democratization and economic liberalization, continues to 
be reflected in the many books lamenting Africa’s awful fate, we must ask why modernity - the 
essence that modernization processes seek to realize - has not taken hold in the continent.   
 
If I may just seize this opportunity to point out a significant differential in the penetration 
of modern ideals in Nigeria and Jamaica, respectively, I would like to use the example of the fate 
of the army sergeant who slapped the civilian in that incident a few weeks ago at the residence of 
Luciano.  The Jamaican army authorities immediately disciplined the non-commissioned officer 
and it made headlines in the papers and the incident was discussed in parliament.  In Nigeria the 
officer would have to have killed the civilian and, even then, there is no guarantee that he would 
ever be punished for his action.  Meanwhile, both countries operate a judicial system in which 
the accuser cannot at the same time be the judge.  Nigeria is not atypical of the situation in the 
continent.   
 
Why has modernity not taken root in the continent?  Some might say that Africa is hostile 
to modernity and its presuppositions.  Others might contend that Africans are congenitally 
incapable of working modernity.  Both explanations have been canvassed in scholarly 
discussions in History, Political Science, and Political Economy about Africa’s situation.  
Neither explanation is plausible.  But making the case for their implausibility is not part of what I 
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propose to do here this evening.  Rather, my aim is to argue that the kind of colonialism that took 
root in Africa ended up subverting modernity rather than enhancing it.  
 
I am suggesting that when we think of the history of the relations between Africa and 
modernity, we should do so in the following terms: the Africa - modernity relation before 
colonialism and the same relation after colonialism.  Why does it matter how we frame our 
understanding of the relation?  Because what attitude we take towards the Africa - modernity 
relation is sure to be coloured by whether or not we apprehend this historiography and take its 
implications seriously.  If we do, some of the conundrums associated with the relation will begin 
to make sense.  For instance, the near total absence of the contributions of African intellectuals to 
the dominant narratives of the discourse of modernity will astound even more profoundly 
especially as it is clearer how the absence came to be constituted and why it persists.  It will also 
place in clearer relief why it seems that the only relationship that African intellectuals at the 
present time can or do have with modernity is one of conflict rather than embrace.   
 
And, finally, it will enable us to retrieve more aggressively those works by Africans of 
the period before colonialism who had made modernity their own and sought to remake their 
communities in its image.  I must say that the track record of Caribbean scholars is far better in 
this respect.  Works by Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall, Rupert Lewis, Lewis R. Gordon, C.L.R. James, 
Fitzroy Baptiste, Paget Henry, and Anthony Bogues, exploring the contributions of Caribbean 
thinkers attest to the correctness of my claim.  As an element of a more complete intellectual 
history of the African world, such a move is to be commended on its own.  As a way to equip our 
young with credible, because more grounded, alternatives to the penny a copy, flavour of the day 
approach to theory that many of us are goaded into by our lack of access to the fullness of our 
intellectual heritage, its value is inestimable.  Needless to say, such a situation will augur well for 
relevant scholarship. 
 
When colonialism was imposed on Africa, it was done, partly - I say partly because the 
main reason for colonialism in Africa was the exploitation of Africa’s resources - in the name of 
bringing to Africans the fruits of civilization - a synonym for modernity in those days.  
Elsewhere I have shown the differences between the types of colonialism that obtained in the 
modern era.  Here is how the arch-imperialist philosopher, Lord Lugard, put the philosophical 
justification for British colonialism.  The title of his major work, The Dual Mandate in Tropical 
Africa, itself is a short-hand description of what he took to be the charge that the British had in 
colonizing Africa.  The ‘dual mandate’ refers to the responsibility that it had pleased God and 
history to bequeath to Great Britain, to make available to Europeans and the rest of humanity the 
riches and resources of Africa which, according to him,  
 
lay wasted and ungarnered ... because the natives did not know their use and value.  
Millions of tons of oil-nuts, for instance, grew wild without the labour of man, and lay 
rotting in the forests.  Who can deny the right of the hungry people of Europe to utilise 
the wasted bounties of nature, or that the task of developing these resources was, as Mr. 
Chamberlain expressed it, a ‘trust for civilisation’ and for the benefit of mankind?7 
 
On the other hand, Great Britain must bring the light of civilization to the blighted heathenish 
peoples of the ‘Dark Continent’. 
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As Roman imperialism laid the foundations of modern civilisation, and led the wild 
barbarians of these islands [Britain, that is] along the path of progress, so in Africa to-day 
we are repaying the debt, and bringing to the dark places of the earth, the abode of 
barbarism and cruelty, the torch of culture and progress, while ministering to the material 
needs of our own civilisation.8 
 
Lugard voiced this common sentiment among Africa’s colonizers more eloquently than any 
other.9 
 
Even at the present time, it is not unusual for apologists of colonialism to claim that 
modernity represents part of colonialism’s legacy in the African continent.  But, if this is the 
case, then it is fair to expect that conditions on the continent will reflect some of the tenets that 
we identified above.  Given that this definitely is not the case, we are then forced to conclude 
that the reason that modernity has not taken roots in the continent is because Africans are 
congenitally unable to embrace or work it, or there is something in the African soil and air that is 
inhospitable to modernity.  I know that these are the standard ways of accounting for the rocky 
relation between Africa and modernity.   
 
Africa’s challenge to modernity, in part, requires the scholars of modernity, African and 
non-African like, to explore in more depth the real history of the genealogy of modernity in 
Africa.  Such a perusal will show that at least in West Africa, before the imposition of formal 
colonialism, there had been Africans who, under the tutelage of Christian missions, had been 
inducted into modernity and had become apostles of the way of life it enjoined.10  They were 
frustrated in their efforts once colonialism was imposed and, this is very important, our current 
understanding of the relations between Africa and modernity has been framed by this colonial 
inflection. 
 
This is an important point.  When the initial crop of Africans to embrace modernity did 
so, they did, for the most part, with a view to marrying the best of their indigenous heritage with 
what they had imbibed from the missionary school of modernity.  When they were supplanted by 
the racist band of colonial administrators and their allies in the trader and missionary 
communities, their capacity to influence the course of change in their territories became 
attenuated.  On one hand, many of them gave up on the transition and embraced a very 
conservative agenda, which saw them seeking to restore so-called African values and practices 
with nary a critical consciousness.  Others kept up their engagement with modernity and 
persisted in deepening their work on the transition.  There is little doubt, however, that they no 
longer controlled the direction or pace of social change in the territories.   
 
On the other hand, the new cohort of administrators, missionaries and traders 
disseminated the idea of the backwardness of African peoples which they traced to Africans’ 
non-membership of the human community.  As time went on, modernity, in the African 
imaginary, became one with that in the name of which they were imperialized and brutalized.  
Meanwhile, the education that was purveyed by racism-dominated colonial teachers ultimately 
extirpated the memory of the earlier African converts to modernity as builders or propagators of 
the modern way of life.  In the consciousness of subsequent generations of educated Africans 
they merely survived as local pastors, not even missionaries.  The fact that very few Nigerians 
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know more about Samuel Ajayi Crowther, than that he was “the slave boy who became bishop”, 
is the ultimate testament to how completely colonial mis-education structured the collective 
memory of educated Nigerians, to take a limited example.     
 
By the time that independence was attained, African scholars had been manoeuvred into 
having a mainly antagonistic relationship to modernity which is conflated with all things 
Western.  Bereft of the recollection of their forebears’ more creative and confident engagement 
with modernity, generations of African scholars in the post-independence period were dissuaded 
from embracing modernity as a matter of principle, only as one of expediency.  That attitude 
continues to permeate the continent. 
 
Let us take just one illustration:  the principle of subjectivity and its sociological 
concomitant, individualism.  Had the theorists and practitioners of colonialism adhered to their 
much-vaunted intention to transform the colonies and protectorates into modern polities and 
socialize their inhabitants into the modern way of life, I would like to argue, the history of the 
former colonies and protectorates would not be what it has been so far.  First, the principle of 
subjectivity and its sociological concomitant, individualism, were not extended to the natives.  In 
the colonial situation, as Frantz Fanon pointed out so poignantly, the native could not be an 
individual.11  The native is a type and all differentiation is erased from native society.  One 
cannot overemphasize this point.  The explanation is very simple.  There is an abiding belief, 
shared by Africans and non-Africans alike, that African societies are essentially communalistic 
and there is a fundamental reluctance to pollute these waters with any introduction of the bad 
philosophy of individualism.  The continuing influence of the basic models disseminated by 
colonial anthropology is unmistakable here.  This is a problematic characterization.  It ignores 
the fact that what need to be accounted for when we investigate social forms are what type of 
individualism can be found in various societies, what indigenous nodes of individualist 
transformations are there to be isolated, and how those nodes were affected by colonialism.  
What is at issue is not whether there were forms of individualism in any but the most primitive 
societies, but what kind of individualism there is and what role it plays in social ordering.  In 
addition, a blanket condemnation of individualism reinforces the reluctance to identify its 
presence in African societies, past and present.  I abjure such a blanket condemnation.   
 
Every colonial situation is marked by hierarchy.  And, I do not wish to claim that the 
principle of subjectivity or the formal equality of all human beings in modernity preclude the 
installation of any hierarchy.  But not all hierarchies are undesirable.  Hierarchies of merit are 
constitutive of the modern age.  Think of the guild master-apprentice relationship.  To assimilate 
the formal equality of guild masters and apprentices as human beings to their equality in the 
workshop situation is to abort the skill transference process that is supposed to mark the relation 
between the master craftsman and his apprentices.  The earlier apostles of modernity in Africa 
were willing to assume the role of apprentices to Europe’s master craftsmen’s.  They did accept 
that there had been a severe rupture—Slavery and the Atlantic Slave Trade— in the flow of their 
history which had adversely impacted their agency and, hence, history-making capacity.  They 
had reason to look forward to their graduation from apprentices to guild masters in their own 
right after a period of instruction. 
 
For the process of grooming just described to succeed, the masters must not merely 
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concede the humanity of their apprentices; they must take it for granted.  The only issue between 
them must be the willingness of the master to impart know-how and the teachability of the 
apprentice and his enthusiasm for instruction.  The master, too, must prepare to make himself 
irrelevant to the continuing life of the apprentice beyond graduation and the success of the entire 
process must be judged by whether or not the master works to make himself irrelevant beyond 
graduation and the apprentice progresses from journeyman to craft master.   
 
Furthermore, for the above process to succeed, the master must additionally recognize, 
embrace, and work with the autonomy of his apprentices.  To put it technically, success requires 
that he treat the apprentices as autonomous individuals possessed of different capacities and 
infinitely variable in their personalities.  Had the colonizers taken seriously their much professed 
self-appointed task of moving Africans along the path to modernity, they would have fostered 
the Africans’ capacity for autonomy and cultivated it in their sponsorship of individualism as a 
principle of social ordering.     
 
Can we say that what we just described characterizes the nature of the relationship 
between Africans and their erstwhile colonizers at the present time?  All we need to do is look at 
how Africans continue to be without voice and when they show that they have a voice, a singular 
marker of the capacity for autonomy and individuality, how routinely that voice is silenced or 
ignored by their fellow residents of modernity’s mansion.  At the present time, different 
descendants of those who imperialized us in the past always manage to claim somehow that they 
and only they know best what Africans are and what they need.  We see it in Art, Music, and 
other expressive forms. 
 
Now, I would not like to be misunderstood.  Many of us Africans are afraid of autonomy.  
The principle of subjectivity is a double-edged sword.  It means that when one messes things up 
she must take responsibility for her actions.  She must be ready to take her lumps, so to speak.  
Are Africans so ready?  I always marvel at the ability of African leaders to bask in the role of the 
appointed beggars to the world.  They do not dream big dreams.  They take no big risks.  They 
are always satisfied with the handouts from their erstwhile imperial rulers, forever begging for 
increases in their pocket money, welfare amounts, call it what you will.  Either they have 
forgotten or, worse still, they never learned how to be subjects and cannot bother to acquire it. 
 
Our scholars are no different.  In the academy,  at the same time that no serious academic 
associations outside of South Africa survive, African academics always find a way to make sure 
that the African Studies Association either in the United States, Canada, or even as far away as 
Australia, does not lack in fresh blood from Africa to enable it to thrive, not just survive.  Herein 
lies another aspect of the challenge: Africa and Africans should bet on subjectivity, embrace 
autonomy with all its attendant risks, and stand or fall accordingly.  Even if we were to fall in 
that situation we would be falling gallantly and with our self-respect intact. 
 
In lieu of autonomy and the risks that it entails, we have persistently embraced the aid 
model bequeathed to us by colonialism.  Because colonialism denied our humanity, it could not 
trust us to have judgment, much less exercise it.  It put us on aid, handouts, that had the net effect 
of atrophying our subjectivity and weakening our bodies and minds enough that we hardly ever 
think of solving our problems ourselves without reference to Europe and America.  Here 
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whatever differences I hinted at above exist between Africa and its Diaspora in the history, 
operation, and aftermath of colonialism in them pale into insignificance.  If what I have seen in 
my short stay here in Jamaica in terms of our eagerness to accept handouts from Spain and 
China, to take just the most recent examples, is anything to go by, my Jamaican cousins are as 
much in the vice grip of the aid model, as are their continental relatives.   
 
Just as happens in other situations, we have become addicted to the handouts that others 
are willing to give us.  We are the international equivalents of welfare recipients who misread a 
stop-gap instrument for a way of life.  Needless to say, we suffer from the same indignities—our 
will is bent by our donors; we require their approval for the minutest changes in direction in 
running the affairs of our so-called sovereign countries.  The most humiliating illustration of this 
was a few years ago when the President of Uganda, an exemplar of the so-called new breed of 
leaders in Africa, went cap in hand to meet with a British junior minister to seek permission to 
increase Uganda’s defence budget to facilitate its military’s capacity to fight the LRA insurgency 
in the country. 
 
I daresay that the aid model continues to dominate the relationship between Africa and 
the rest of the world.  Notice that I said the rest of the world.  India and South Korea are now aid 
donors to Africa.  In February 2006, when Chad kicked out oil firms that it said were 
withholding revenues due it, one of them was from Malaysia.12  It is a mark of how inured to aid 
the continent has become that I do not see Africans, especially their intellectuals, thundering 
against the indignity that comes with our being the appointed mendicants to an increasingly 
affluent world.  Africa’s leaders dutifully trooped out to Beijing in November 2006 to have 
Chinese leaders regale them with their, Chinese leaders, that is, desire to do right by Africa 
through aid and unequal trade deals designed only to secure for China more of Africa’s raw 
materials at rates that cannot allow the continent to break free from their dependence on aid.  
They have since done the same to Turkey and India.  The challenge to repudiate the aid model in 
all its insidious manifestations - the Red Campaign, Bono, Live Aid, World Vision, and other 
such campaigns that indulge in the proliferation of pornographic images of African poverty and 
suffering, must make us say enough already.13 
 
Given the centrality of the principle of subjectivity and its sociological concomitant, 
individualism, in the constitution and evolution of modernity, its subversion by the 
administrators is one of the signal failures of colonialism as practiced by the latter.  As we 
remarked earlier, the colonizers denied the humanity of their African wards.  Given that situation 
it stands to reason that they could not entertain the idea that Africans could be individuals.  What 
they did instead was to recognize what they termed “tribes” with all the negative associations - 
herd instinct, unanimity of views, lack of social differentiation - that trailed it.  They invested 
each “tribe” with “individual” traits that failed to recognize, much less accommodate, any 
differences among their individual members.   Unfortunately, many African thinkers have 
adopted this spurious individuality and one can find it at the base of theories of African 
personality inaugurated under the inspiration of Edward Wilmot Blyden in the late nineteenth 
century and later adopted by thinkers ranging from Kwame Nkrumah to Nnamdi Azikiwe.14    
 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century when under the direction of Christianity 
Africans embraced modernity they sought to develop themselves as individuals, even as they 
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recognized and valued their group memberships.  The debates they had among themselves and 
with their European counterparts were dominated by concerns about African agency, the 
possibility of a native church, the creation of new men and women who would be the 
propagators of the new ways of life enjoined by modernity.  By the late nineteenth century and 
the turn of the twentieth, this point of view had been overthrown and supplanted by attitudes that 
questioned the viability of African agency, placed Africans at the bottom rung of the human 
ladder and proceeded to treat them as if they were children.  The consequences that followed 
were devastating for the development of African agency.  They are still with us as I write this as 
I hope to have shown above. 
 
This brings me to the second of our questions above.  I will be brief here.  How have 
Africa and its phenomena featured in the discourse of modernity?  If one looks at the narratives 
of the discourse of modernity, one would think that Africans have only ever been victims of 
modernity, not theorists of it or contributors to its construction.  Nothing could be further from 
the truth.  But the reason for the absence is easy to fathom.  Once formal colonialism was 
imposed, the operators of the system put all their efforts into demonizing all Africans who dared 
to make modernity their own and into excising their contributions from the annals of the history 
of ideas.  Given that by the time of independence in various African countries, the mode of 
education had become completely dominated by the tropes of colonialist pedagogy and 
historiography, it is no surprise that African intellectuals trained under that regime were, for the 
most part, amnesiac towards their own heritage and when they were not, thought lightly of it.  
Those who thought highly of it paid a stiff price in denials of opportunities for advancement 
especially in African institutions.15  Meanwhile, we were all taught to lionize the most ordinary 
of white adventurers in our homelands and know nothing or have the most perfunctory 
understanding of the contributions of our own intellectuals.   
 
One part of the challenge that Africa poses to modernity is for those who subscribe to it 
to have a fuller understanding of the true history of the movement.  This understanding has been 
expanded where Asia is concerned.  Africa remains the perpetual absence.  Here we need to 
borrow a leaf from India.  Asia looms so large now in the discourse of modernity not because 
Euro-American intellectuals suddenly woke up to realize the immense place of India in the 
constitution of modernity and its discourse.  No, Indian scholars, armed with a robust sense of 
their subjectivity, forced this recognition on Europe and North America.  That is what African 
and African Diasporic scholars must do.    A good place to start is by acquainting ourselves with 
the heritage of intellectual ideas in the global African world, not merely those that have received 
the sanction of authority by their inclusion in the so-called leading journals of Euro-America.  As 
the saying goes, if you write, read, and discuss it among yourselves, they will read and discuss it, 
following your lead.   
 
Why ought we to do the things that I suggested above?  Because doing them matters to 
the present and future of Africa and those of its descendants around the world.  I give just one 
example.  Here again we see the divergent paths in the aftermath of colonialism in Africa and in 
the Caribbean.  With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, where a misguided attempt failed, 
and Grenada where it failed woefully in spite of what looked initially like success, no country of 
the Anglo-Caribbean has experienced coup d’etat or attempts at them, except for the insurrection 
in Trinidad and Tobago with its religious orientation.  Why more scholars don’t celebrate this 
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remarkable success as a testament to success at being modern by the inhabitants of these isles 
escapes me.  The situation in the continent is much different.   
 
Many countries in Africa are at the present time instances of what are called newly-
democratizing countries.  But the democracy that is being canvassed and installed in them is of a 
peculiarly modern inflection.  But when one looks at the practice of this democracy and its 
theorizing by African scholars, one is left with a queasy feeling that the so-called debates that are 
taking place in the continent are not the right ones.  Liberal democracy is what supposedly we 
are operating, but we hardly ever have debates about the freedom of the individual, about the rule 
of law, about taxation and representation a principle under severe test in this country as I write 
this, about the responsibility of the governors to the governed, or the basis of governance in the 
consent of the governed, all supremely modern principles that, curiously, no longer feature in the 
political discourse in our lands.  This has not always been the case.   
 
In the immediate post-independence period, African politicians and political parties wrote 
copiously and, in a handful of cases, profoundly about freedom and its importance in the political 
lives of Africans and their polities.  No doubt, it is easy to dismiss such writings as carry-overs 
from the struggle for independence from colonial rule when movement leaders appropriated the 
language of freedom and self-determination to oust colonial rule.  But such a dismissal is 
mistaken, if not unwarranted.  In the first place, it is to deny the possibility that African thinkers, 
who also led the struggle for independence from colonial rule, actually believed in the cause of 
freedom and sought actively to realize the kind of societies in which there is freedom for all.  
Secondly, it is to ignore the ample evidence of African thinkers’ continuing engagement with the 
connected ideas of freedom and self-determination after independence.  They may have failed at 
the practice of it - and there are very good theoretical reasons for this failure.  But that they were 
exercised by its philosophical dimensions can only doubted by those who are unfamiliar with 
their writings.  As I have written elsewhere, 
 
Obafemi Awolowo wrote Path to Nigerian Freedom;16 Kwame Nkrumah wrote Towards 
Colonial Freedom17 and I Speak of Freedom18; Oginga Odinga lamented the 
unfulfillment of the promise of freedom after independence was won in Not Yet Uhuru19 
[Swahili for ‘freedom’]; Julius Nyerere wrote Freedom and Development20; Nelson 
Mandela knew that there was No Easy Walk to Freedom21; and Kenneth Kaunda asserted: 
Zambia Must be Free22.  These and others are some of the basic texts of modern African 
political philosophy.  One only wished that our professional philosophical output would 
reflect this simple fact.  Nor were these preoccupations with freedom limited to political 
leaders or thinkers.  They also featured in popular arts, especially highlife music by stars 
ranging from Ghana’s E.T. Mensah to Nigeria’s Victor Olaiya and Adeolu Akinsanya.23 
 
I can cite equivalents in calypso and reggae.  Rare are those occasions now when a contemporary 
African - continental and Diasporic - politician or leader or even intellectual presents any serious 
intellectual discursus on similar themes.   
 
In recent times, Africa has witnessed several elections at all levels of government in 
which multiple parties have contested for power.  This situation mirrors the immediate post-
independence period when multiple parties contended for votes, too, before the scourge of 
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single-party rule and the cancer of military rule combined to arrest the continent’s development 
in all directions.  But there is a significant qualitative difference between then and now: back 
then parties and their leaders, in many cases, fought elections and canvassed their respective 
electorates on the basis of ideological divisions based on philosophical orientations regarding 
human nature, the nature of society, the appropriate relation between the individual and the state, 
the grounds of legitimate power in the polity, and the privileges and forbearances of citizenship. 
 
At the present time both African political leaders and intellectuals either believe that the 
philosophical challenges just adumbrated have been met in contemporary African polities or are 
bereft of any awareness of the importance of such questions to the kind of political practice that 
would deliver the promise of modern political arrangements to even the lowliest African or, if 
they are aware, they do not have the wherewithal to address them.  Whatever the case is, what is 
clear in the present situation is that African politics has become reduced to “ethnic balancing”, 
“religious permutations”, “feeding the people”, and other such inanities.  For the most part these 
days, political parties in African countries exist to win elections so that they can become the sole 
distributors of largesse.  There is hardly any debate about the core questions of political 
philosophy and the parties, for the most part, are nondescript patchworks of personal and 
regional interests dominated by moneybags and their sycophantic hangers-on. 
 
Let me end with an illustration of why I insist that the debates that we are having are not 
the right ones.  In the early twentieth century one of the pioneers of modern African political 
philosophy wrote: 
 
We claim, in common with the rest of mankind, that taxation without representation is a 
bad thing, and we are pledged, as all free peoples have had to do, that in our several 
communities the African shall have that common weapon for the protection and 
safeguarding of his rights and interests, namely, the franchise.  It is desirable, we hold, 
that by our vote we shall determine by what laws we shall be governed and how the 
revenues which we help to put together shall be utilized. 
 
Equally do we hold with others that there should be free scope for the members of the 
community, irrespective of creed or colour, to hold any office under the crown or flag to 
which a person’s merits entitle him or her.24 
 
I would like the reader to fasten upon the key phrases that I have stressed of the passage I 
quoted from J.E. Casely Hayford.  There is not a single one of the phrases that does not refer in 
some way or another to the components of modernity that we identified earlier in this paper.  
When the American revolutionaries first made “no taxation without representation” their protest 
song in the eighteenth century they were inaugurating a new way of conceptualizing the 
relationship between the governor and the governed.  But one cannot fully grasp the significance 
of this orientation unless one comes to a good understanding of the more ultimate principle that 
is enfolded in the idea of representation.  The franchise is the political surrogate of the 
fundamental principle that free sovereign individuals should not have their wills bent by anyone 
except one to and by whom they have consented to have their will so bent.  Once this 
fundamental requirement is met, the authority so installed can proceed to levy taxes and compel 
these sovereign individuals to do as it wishes, insofar as it does not subvert the power given it to 
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the service of faction.  I am sure that the current Jamaican government might appropriate this 
cloak of legitimacy for its recent budget.  Such an appropriation should be the topic of a vigorous 
debate.  Finally, only merit, not ethnic membership, religious preference, or the like, entitles a 
person to hold any office in the modern state.  When we combine these with the earlier 
injunctions regarding the worth of freedom and its constitutive role in the philosophical 
anthropology that under-girds modern institutions and practices, we can now ask whether it can 
seriously be doubted that an Africa in which these aspirations have been realized remains in the 
realm of dreams.   
 
Of greater importance is the issue of the relevance that this rich legacy of freedom and 
self-determination has for the contemporary situation in Africa.  Yes, Africans need food, 
housing, health services, and education.  But to reduce the focus of political discourse and 
practice to these pragmatic concerns is to miss the woods for the trees.  After all, the 
aforementioned needs are no less predicated of the lower animals.  What is peculiarly human in 
the best of philosophical traditions is to rise above the level of the needs that we share with our 
beastly cousins.  That the issues of freedom and self-governance loom large as indicia of a good 
life for humans cannot be denied in the modern world.  That African politicians and intellectuals 
are no longer mindful of or agitated by such themes is to be lamented and excoriated.  To the 
extent that we reintroduce the attainment of these ideals as a metric by which to judge the quality 
of our polities and the performance of our politicians, to that extent would we be restoring to the 
centre of our concerns the dignity of even the lowliest Africans and their capacity to lead lives 
marked by self-control and beauty.  Hence, to the question of why we should reengage with 
modernity in the contemporary world the answer is simple: doing so promises a better life for 
Africans than what is on offer at the present time. 
 
In conclusion, in talking of the challenge of Africa to modernity, the most important issue 
is not to talk as if Africa is squatting outside of modernity and is to be understood as asking 
modernity to show why she should do business with it.  The fortunes of Africa and modernity 
have been intertwined for at least two and a half centuries.  What Africa needs to do is to fight 
those who seek to keep Africa apart from the rest of humanity in order to patronize her while at 
the same time forcing the world to see what the African world has made of modernity in her own 
idioms and invite the world to drink from its wisdom of which there is abundance.25 
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